

ARGENTINA'S REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH

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with the aid of the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association

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INTRODUCTION

ONE of the most surprising events in Latin America in 1930 was the revolution of September 6 which overthrew President Hipólito Irigoyen of Argentina. Since the unification of the country, no political change in Argentina had hitherto been brought about by force of arms. An electoral reform law of February 10, 1912¹ resulted in a more representative government and was considered evidence of the progress of democracy in Latin America. It was this reform, in fact, which made possible the peaceful political revolution of 1916 when the *Partido Radical*² came into power. It was therefore generally believed that Argentina would continue to set the example in South America in the solution of political problems by means of the ballot.

The revolution of September 6, 1930 upset this belief. In some quarters abroad it was hastily concluded that with Argentina's reversion to the classic Latin American weapon of armed revolt all hope of democracy among the Latin American states had vanished. The present report attempts to set forth the causes of the revolution and the principal facts in the present situation.

Few Latin American countries in the last fifty years have developed as rapidly as Argentina. Its 1,080,000 square miles of territory, embracing the eastern seaboard, the vast pampas and the Andean *cordilleras*,

and its 11,500,000 inhabitants make it the third largest Latin American republic in point of population. The largest city is the capital, Buenos Aires, with a population of about 2,225,000.

Argentina has undergone rapid economic development. Foreign investments amounting to approximately four billion dollars have given it the greatest railroad mileage in Latin America. Of the 25,640 miles of railroads, 5,970 are owned by the state. Most of the land under cultivation is used for agriculture and stock raising. In recent years Argentina's position in world economy has been of great importance, due to its exports of wheat, meat, maize, linseed and wool.

The government is organized on the usual division of executive, legislative and judicial powers. The President, who is elected for a term of six years, may not succeed himself but may be re-elected after the lapse of one term.³ The fourteen provinces and ten territories are granted a large measure of home rule constitutionally; in practice, however, there has been a decided curtailment of local autonomy, largely owing to the increasing power and authority of the President.

In the international relations of South America, Argentina has played a conspicuous part. It has consistently favored the settlement of international disputes by arbitration. This has been particularly true in the settlement of boundary questions.

1. Cf. p. 310.

2. Cf. p. 310.

3. Article 77 of the Argentine Constitution.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE PARTIDO RADICAL

From 1861 to 1916 the political life of Argentina was dominated by conservative leaders, supported principally by the landed aristocracy. They controlled the city and province of Buenos Aires and through it the economic life of the whole country. The national government was thus made an instrument of conservative interests, which sought to maintain the concentrated ownership of landed property, to control foreign trade to the advantage of Buenos Aires, and to monopolize the distribution of political appointments.

The stability of this régime, unshaken until the 1890's, was affected subsequently by many changed conditions, principally the increase in immigration. In 1910 over 345,000 immigrants entered the country, most of whom settled permanently. Although a large number of these immigrants went into the fields to harvest wheat and care for livestock, thousands remained in Buenos Aires, where they found work in manufacturing and shipping. In 1913 there were over 400,000 industrial workers in Argentina, concentrated chiefly in the capital—an increase of more than 240 per cent in 18 years.⁴ With the rapid increase and concentration of a working class in Buenos Aires, there soon developed industrial and social problems along lines familiar to other parts of the world.

Of the 150,000 workers' families living in the capital, 80 per cent lived in one-room houses for which they often paid in rent as much as one-third of their income. Business depressions threw thousands out of work; in 1914 over 15 per cent of all industrial workers were unemployed. Tenant farmers, likewise living on meagre incomes, began at this time to demand agrarian reforms.

Side by side with the growing social unrest, a revolt arose against the continued dominance of the conservatives in politics. This movement dated back to 1890 when Leandro Alem attempted to destroy the old party system by armed force. Subsequent efforts to dislodge the conservatives by revolution also failed, but by 1910 the *Unión*

Cívica Radical, later known as the *Partido Radical*, of which Leandro Alem was the founder and leader, had grown into a strong and militant opposition.

THE RISE OF HIPOLITO IRIGOYEN

In 1910 the titular head of the *Unión Cívica Radical* was the nephew of Leandro Alem, Hipólito Irigoyen, born in the province of Buenos Aires in 1853. During a strenuous career as police chief, deputy, political agitator, teacher and cattle raiser, Irigoyen had maintained a stubborn opposition to the politicians in power. He had steadfastly refused appointments in conservative administrations and had become the rallying point for all who wanted to overthrow the existing bureaucracy.

Although Irigoyen's program offered the discontented workers nothing concrete in the way of social reforms, it did offer a change in leaders. He was retiring, simple in his tastes, and ever ready to give his services in defending political prisoners. His very aloofness contributed to the growing legend that he was the man destined to solve the country's pressing problems.

It was the combination of personal popularity with leadership of the *Unión Cívica Radical* that brought Irigoyen to the presidency in 1916. Up to 1912 the *Radicales*, as Irigoyen's followers were called, had refrained from going to the polls, asserting that fair elections were impossible under a corrupt administration and the existing electoral laws. In that year, however, an electoral reform law was enacted which established compulsory voting and the secret ballot.⁵ With this guarantee of fair elections the *Radicales* went to the polls in 1912 and captured eight seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1916 the *Partido Radical* carried the country and elected Irigoyen President.

When President Irigoyen's first term ended in 1922, he was succeeded by Marcelo

4. In Buenos Aires the number of industrial workers increased by 90,000 from 1905 to 1910. Cf. Alejandro E. Bunge, *La desocupación en la Argentina* (Madrid, 1917, second edition), p. 9.

5. Under the terms of the law, the balloting and counting of votes were supervised by boards appointed by the federal and provincial judges (Articles 30 and 51). The counting of ballots was safeguarded further by permitting each candidate in the elections to have a representative present during the count (Article 9). The judges serving on the supervisory boards were also charged with the duty of checking the lists of electors to prevent fraud. For the text of the law, cf. *Ley de 10 de Febrero de 1912, Recopilación de leyes usuales de la Republica Argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1912).

T. de Alvear, a prominent member of the *Partido Radical* and a former Minister to France. At the close of Alvear's term in 1928, Irigoyen was again elected President.

The *Partido Radical*, as led by Irigoyen, did not have a political program aside from that of turning out of office the conservative bureaucracy. This was accomplished in 1916 and the way was then clear for social and economic reforms. The *Partido Radical*, however, was not "radical" in the sense in which the word is understood in the United States, and it did not proceed with these reforms. In his first message to Congress, Irigoyen did not even set forth the program which his party proposed to follow.⁶ This attitude is characteristic of the whole history of the *Partido Radical*. In 1909, for instance, when Irigoyen had been pressed to take a stand on the issue of free trade, he stated that there was room within the *Partido Radical* for the most divergent social and economic theories.⁷ Members were read out of the party for insisting on definite statements of policy. Irigoyen summed up his party's program by saying that it was an "apostolate, an ultimate principle, a spiritual value that persists across the centuries."⁸

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PARTIDO RADICAL PERSONALISTA

It was this absence of a party program, as well as opposition to President Irigoyen's leadership, that led to the eventual split of the *Partido Radical* and the establishment within it of a dominant faction, the *Partido Radical Personalista*, headed by Irigoyen. The *Personalistas* were content to take Irigoyen's orders as their program; the *non-Personalistas* tended more and more to oppose Irigoyen as party dictator, but in their turn they also neglected to formulate a definite program.

The party split, in fact, dated back to the election of Irigoyen to the presidency in 1916. In that election the nineteen electors from the province of Santa Fé, who had triumphed on the ticket of the *Partido Rad-*

ical, threatened to bolt. Since the *Radicales* had only 152 of the 297 electoral votes and a majority was needed to elect, Irigoyen would have lost the presidency had not a truce been arranged with the Sante Fé delegation.⁹ By 1923, however, the party had definitely split in the province of La Plata, and in the following year the opposing factions within the party presented candidates for the same offices. From 1928 to 1930 schisms continued, particularly in Santa Fé, Mendoza and Buenos Aires. As a result, of events during these two years, Irigoyen was left with a small group of unconditional supporters, definitely known as the *Partido Radical Personalista*.

IRIGOYEN'S RE-ELECTION IN 1928

Although by 1928 the *Partido Radical* was definitely disintegrating, this did not prevent Irigoyen's election to the presidency a second time. For this there were several reasons. Irigoyen's *Personalista* faction had been welded into a compact machine, held together by patronage. Furthermore, the Irigoyen legend had persisted. Irigoyen rarely spoke in public; he granted few interviews and shut himself up in his private residence, where it was reported that he conversed with the ghosts of the great men of history.¹⁰ He had won great prestige with the majority of the people by his foreign policy, and his refusal to follow either the Central Powers or the Allies into the World War was considered patriotic and wise. Irigoyen kept the confidence of the workers in restricting exports of foodstuffs, thereby keeping prices down. Whenever prices on sugar or wheat rose too high, the government bought these commodities and sold them in the open market.

The failure of Irigoyen's second administration and the revolution of September 6, 1930 will be discussed in the light of Irigoyen's conflict with Congress, his policy of intervening in the affairs of the provinces, his failure to meet the demands of the working class, the opposition of business groups, his foreign policy, and the effects of the economic depression.

6. Cf. Ismael B. Escobar, *Los presidentes argentinos* (Buenos Aires, 1923), II, p. 493.

7. Jorge G. Foví, *Discursos, escritos y polémicas del Doctor Hipólito Irigoyen* (Buenos Aires, 1923), p. 115.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

9. Escobar, *Los presidentes argentinos*, cited, II, p. 491.

10. Pierre Lhande, "Irigoyen et Uriburu," *Etudes*, November 20, 1930, p. 464.

IRIGOYEN'S POLICIES AS PRESIDENT

CONFLICTS WITH CONGRESS

One of the primary objects of the electoral reform of 1912, according to its framer, Sr. Roque Sáenz Peña, had been to create an independent legislative branch of the national government. This object was in part realized. Many Senators and Deputies in Buenos Aires did not hesitate to criticize the executive, and frequently resolutions were passed despite the known opposition of the President. Irigoyen, however, looked upon Congress very much as he looked upon his own party: his word was not to be questioned by either. When Congress voted overwhelmingly to sever diplomatic relations with Germany during the World War, Irigoyen refused to take the step.¹¹ He refused to submit government documents requested by congressional investigating committees.¹² He informed Congress that he was "no ordinary executive";¹³ recess appointees, if rejected by Congress, were merely re-appointed during the next recess; budgets were not presented for discussion and approval because there was no time to draw them up,¹⁴ and government expenditures were met out of current revenue without legislative authorization.¹⁵ When criticized for failing to seek the cooperation of Senators and Deputies, Irigoyen replied: "I am the supreme leader of the nation. . . . I know the origin and the development of all the institutions under which humanity lives."¹⁶ Thus antagonized, Congress in turn refused all cooperation, and the opposition blocked all attempts to consider constructive legislation.

Although Irigoyen controlled the Chamber, the Senate remained hostile. In 1929, when the opposition minority in the Chamber attacked the President at every session, Irigoyen instructed his followers to absent themselves.¹⁷ The absence of a quorum prevented the holding of sessions, which in turn prevented the opposition Deputies from set-

ting forth their grievances. Irigoyen did not refute the charge that he was governing without Congress, and in December 1929 one of his supporters in Congress referred to him as a "temporary dictator."¹⁸

INTERVENTION IN THE PROVINCES

Perhaps the most important matter upon which Irigoyen was criticized in Congress was his policy of intervention in the provinces. This policy by no means originated with Irigoyen. It was practiced by many of his predecessors and had long constituted one of Argentina's most serious internal political problems.

These interventions usually took the following form:¹⁹ An appeal would be presented to the federal government to intervene in a certain province where it was alleged the Constitution had been violated. The central government would accede to the petition and send its agents to take over the affairs of the province in question, basing this action on Article VI of the Constitution.²⁰ The provincial government would be "reorganized" and the federal agents or *interventores* would remain until recalled to Buenos Aires. The abuse of this practice made it possible for a political party when coming into power to sweep its opponents from office, even in purely provincial and municipal governments. Between 1853 and 1917 seventy-two such interventions took place.²¹

Economic Causes of the Interventions

Aside from the political reasons, there are other important causes for this practice. Among these is the extreme concentration of population in the city and province of Buenos Aires, where between 40 and 45 per cent of the population is found.²² As a result, the dominance of Buenos Aires in national politics is increased. From the economic

11. L. M. Moreno Quintana, *La diplomacia de Irigoyen* (La Plata, 1928), p. 168-9.

12. Benjamín Villafañe, *El último dictador* (Buenos Aires, 1922), p. 234.

13. *Mensaje al Honorable Congreso*, October 15, 1921.

14. *Mensaje*, December 1929.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Fovilé, *Discursos, escritos y polémicas del Doctor Hipólito Irigoyen*, cited, p. 56.

17. Cámara de Diputados, *Diario de Sesiones*, 1929, Vol. I, p. 320.

18. *La Nación* (Buenos Aires), December 14, 1929.

19. For a documentary description of a typical intervention, cf. Ministerio del Interior, *Crónica Informativa*, April 1928, p. 5-9.

20. Article VI provides: "The Federal Government shall have the right to intervene in the territory of the provinces in order to guarantee the republican form of government or to repel foreign invasion; and when requested by the constituted authorities to maintain them in power or to re-establish them if they shall have been deposed by sedition or invasion from another province."

21. José Giustiniani, *Cuadro Sinóptico de las intervenciones del Gobierno Federal en las Provincias* (Buenos Aires, 1917), p. 19.

22. Alejandro E. Bunge, *La economía argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1928), I, p. 93.

standpoint, the predominance of the capital is equally great. In 1929, customs duties collected in the ports of the republic amounted to 186,718,571 gold pesos. Of this amount, over 154,000,000 gold pesos were collected in the port of Buenos Aires alone.²³ The revenues of the city and province of Buenos Aires normally amount to about 30 per cent of the budgeted revenues of all the provinces combined. Furthermore, deficits in many of the provinces frequently are met by subsidies from the central government, which draws most of its revenues from the capital city and port.

On the other hand, the provinces believe that the national government is primarily concerned with the economic needs of Buenos Aires and that it neglects to protect the interests of the interior. They point to the fact that for every paper peso spent on roads in the interior, two and a half paper pesos are spent in Buenos Aires.²⁴ They point further to imports of rice, sugar, Paraguay tea, fresh fruit and cotton-seed oil, all of which are produced in the hinterland—Tucumán, La Rioja, Salta, Misiones and Jujuy. High railway rates, they assert, make it impossible for wines from Mendoza to compete with imported European wines in Buenos Aires. Unable to obtain tariff protection from the national Congress, which they consider “a sort of municipal council of Buenos Aires,” the provincial legislatures resort to inter-provincial duties—San Juan, for example, taxing beer produced in another province²⁵ and Salta prohibiting the importation of alfalfa from Santiago del Estero. This condition has been so acute at times that charges of “interprovincial dumping” have been made. The disparity in economic strength between Buenos Aires on the one hand and the interior provinces on the other paves the way for the political domination of the capital over the entire country.

Irigoyen's Record of Interventions

Irigoyen made liberal use of interventions during his first six-year term as President. Alleging that provincial and municipal governments had fallen into the hands of cor-

rupt politicians, he asserted that “no human power could have prevented me from reorganizing all these illegitimate governments.”²⁶ *Interventores* were sent to San Juan, Mendoza, Corrientes, Santa Fé and Córdoba. In some cases the interventions were prolonged, as in the case of Mendoza, for more than a year. The federal government favored provincial loans to meet local administrative expenditures, and bond issues were authorized for that purpose. In Córdoba 72,000,000 paper pesos were voted in August 1929 for road construction, thereby doubling the public debt of the province.²⁷ Since the *interventores* were chosen from the ranks of the unconditional *Personalistas*, this policy of interventions not only embittered the opposition but also increased the friction within the ranks of the *Partido Radical*. Perhaps on no single issue was Irigoyen more bitterly attacked in the Buenos Aires press—notably in the influential *La Nación*—than on this frequent and prolonged interference with local affairs.²⁸

FOREIGN POLICY

The conduct of Argentina's foreign affairs during Irigoyen's first term was directed almost exclusively by the President, without the advice or cooperation of the opposition. During this period Argentine foreign policy was marked by sensitiveness on questions of national prestige, by reserve and, in the opinion of Irigoyen's strongest opponents, by testiness.

Neutrality During the World War

During the World War Irigoyen's neutrality was unhesitating and consistent. This policy of neutrality received its severest test in the Luxburg incident.²⁹ Argentine shipping had suffered at the hands of German submarines in European waters and Irigoyen protested energetically to the Imperial German Government. Argentina received assurances that such incidents as the sinking of the *Monte Protegido* would not be repeated, but in September 1917 the State Department at Washington intercepted dispatches from the German Minister at Buenos Aires, Count

26. Fovíe, *Discursos, escritos y polémicas del Doctor Hipólito Irigoyen*, cited, p. 55.

27. *Review of the River Plate*, August 2, 1929, p. 7.

28. Cf. *La Nación*, November 11, 1929.

29. Cf. Percy A. Martin, *Latin America and the World War* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1925).

23. *Comercio Exterior Argentino*, Boletín 206, p. 27-28.

24. Bunge, *La economía argentina*, cited, II, p. 168. (The par value of the paper peso is .4245 United States currency.)

25. *Revista de Economía Argentina*, April 1929, p. 311.

Luxburg, in which he advised the sinking "without trace" of Argentine ships then on the high seas. The publication of these dispatches raised a storm of indignation. The Argentine Ambassador in Washington, Señor Naón, urged Irigoyen to break with Germany.³⁰ The press, both in New York and Buenos Aires, campaigned for a declaration of war; the Senate and Chamber of Deputies voted to sever relations with Germany. Irigoyen, however, closed the incident by immediately dismissing Count Luxburg.

This inclination to follow his own counsel Irigoyen showed in other ways. In spite of criticism he recognized the Kerensky government of Russia in September 1917, and extended credits to England and France which enabled these two countries to buy Argentina's wheat surplus.³¹ When Uruguay asked what attitude Argentina would take if a rumored invasion of German colonists from southern Brazil should materialize, Irigoyen unreservedly promised to declare war on the invaders.

Irigoyen and the League of Nations

Irigoyen's self-reliance and directness likewise were revealed in the early relations of Argentina and the League of Nations. In the discussions which preceded the drafting of the Covenant of the League, Colonel House invited several neutral powers, among them Argentina, to give their views in a private and informal manner. Señor Alvear, the Argentine Minister in Paris, attended these meetings and on June 18, 1919 advised his government to adhere to the Covenant without reservations.³² On July 12 Alvear was advised by the Argentine Foreign Minister, Señor Pueyrredón, that Irigoyen had decided to adhere to the Covenant with no reservations whatever (*sin reserva alguna*), and that before taking this action the President had consulted both chambers of Congress.³³ On July 18, therefore, Alvear sent a note to Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary-General of the League, in which he stated that Argentina accepted the Covenant with-

out reservations.³⁴ Sir Eric's answer to this note, dated July 23, was that Argentina's adhesion could not be officially accepted by him since the League had not yet been officially set up and he could not, therefore, exercise the attributes of his office. He inquired, however, whether Argentina's adhesion was to be considered effective as soon as the treaty was ratified and the League established. To this Alvear answered in the affirmative.³⁵

The phraseology of Alvear's notes to Sir Eric gave rise to the impression that Argentina's acceptance of the Covenant was definitive. Irigoyen, however, did not so consider it. In the instructions sent to Alvear, in the replies sent by the Minister and in the statements of Señor Pueyrredón to Congress it is clear that Argentina's acceptance "without reservations" was understood by the Argentine statesmen as acceptance of the principle of a League of Nations without reservations.³⁶ Irigoyen insisted that Argentina was not definitely committed until it had been given an opportunity to discuss the provisions of the Covenant in detail.

Irigoyen's Proposals for a League Covenant

That Irigoyen had his own conception of the way in which the Covenant should have been drafted was shown by his instructions to the Argentine delegation to the First Assembly of the League. According to these instructions, amendments were to be offered before the Assembly on the following points:³⁷

No distinctions to be made between neutrals and belligerents.

All nations to be eligible for admission to the League.

Equality of all states within the League.

Election of the Council by the Assembly.

Compulsory jurisdiction of an international court of justice.

It was believed also that the Argentine delegation would ask that Article XXI, defining the Monroe Doctrine as a regional understanding, be dropped from the Covenant.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*, p. 44, 45, 46.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 10, 11, 15. On September 30, 1920, Señor Pueyrredón stated to the members of Congress that Argentina's acceptance without reservations was to be understood as applying to the general principle of the League but not to the terms of the Covenant.

37. The proposals of the Argentine government were supported by President Arturo Alessandri of Chile. Cf. Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Circular Informativa Mensual* (Buenos Aires, 1920-1921), p. 11.

30. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria, 1917-1918*, p. 58-63.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 115, 137, 190.

32. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Argentina ante la Liga de las Naciones* (Buenos Aires, 1922), p. 42.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

Once the Argentine position became known at Geneva, it was clearly recognized that the proposed amendments involved the drastic recasting of the Covenant.³⁸ To the suggestion that consideration of the amendments be postponed until the meeting of the Second Assembly, the leader of the Argentine delegation, Señor Pueyrredón, replied in the negative, on the ground that such postponement would relegate Argentina to a secondary place.³⁹ This was a direct reflection of President Irigoyen's pressure on the delegation, which by this time had split—Señores Alvear and Pérez counselling a more moderate course. When it became clear that the Assembly would not accept Argentina's position, Señor Pueyrredón withdrew from the Assembly on December 4, 1919.⁴⁰

IRIGOYEN AND PAN-AMERICANISM

Although Irigoyen was succeeded as President by the more moderate Alvear in 1922, Argentina's rôle in international affairs in the Western Hemisphere from 1922 to 1928 followed the basic lines laid down by Irigoyen for the *Partido Radical*. This was best shown by Argentina's part in the Sixth Annual Conference of American States at Havana in 1928.

The head of the Argentine delegation, Honorio Pueyrredón, placed before the conference a proposal that the American republics lower their tariffs.⁴¹ Although many of the Latin American delegations were in sympathy with the principle involved, the majority were opposed to the form in which the proposal was made.⁴² Several sugges-

tions for compromise were advanced, to all of which Pueyrredón was opposed. President Alvear counselled moderation,⁴³ but Pueyrredón did not retreat. He referred to American tariff policies as "aggressive."⁴⁴ He considered that to sign the convention without the Argentine amendment was equivalent to a declaration of economic warfare.⁴⁵ In the light of Pueyrredón's position and in order to preserve a solid front at Havana, Alvear finally agreed to support the leader of the delegation. His decision, however, came too late. On February 15 Pueyrredón resigned as leader of the delegation and as Ambassador to Washington.

Upon Irigoyen's return to the Presidency in 1928, a policy of reserve toward the United States was followed. Ambassador Malbrán was recalled from Washington in November 1928, and the post remained vacant until Irigoyen's fall in September 1930. The republic was not represented at the important Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration in Washington in December 1928. No action was taken on the Kellogg-Briand anti-war pact. When President-Elect Hoover toured South America, his reception in Buenos Aires was regarded by the Argentine press as one of the "coolest" given by any of the republics.

In Argentina the effect of this aloofness in foreign affairs was to add weight to the attacks of the opposition. It was held that Argentina was losing prestige abroad; that the country was forfeiting the moral leadership in the Americas which rightfully belonged to it; and that such a policy would lead to ill-feeling between Argentina and the United States if continued.⁴⁶ To these charges Irigoyen did not answer officially.

38. Apologists for the Argentine position generally agree on this. Cf. César Díaz Cisneros, *La Liga de las naciones y la actitud argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1921), p. 165.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 155. At this time Señor Pueyrredón stated that the Monroe Doctrine had been mentioned in the Covenant merely to satisfy certain sections of public opinion in the United States. In 1928 the Argentine Foreign Office instructed the Argentine member of the Committee on Arbitration and Security at Geneva that it did not consider the Monroe Doctrine a regional understanding, but merely a unilateral policy of the United States which had never been approved explicitly by any other American state. The Argentine government acknowledged the services rendered by the Doctrine against the Holy Alliance and stated that such services might continue to be rendered by the Doctrine "provided it be invoked with discretion." (*Circular Informativa Mensual*, 1928, cited, p. 170; also League of Nations, *Minutes of the Second Session on Arbitration and Security*, p. 90.)

40. In commenting on Argentina's withdrawal, Lord Robert Cecil stated that "if every member of the Assembly were to take the line which the Argentine delegation has taken, no progress would have been possible." Cf. Warren H. Kelchner, *Latin American Relations with the League of Nations*, World Peace Foundation, Vol. XII, No. 6, p. 97.

41. Cf. *Report of the Delegates of the United States to the Sixth International Conference of American States* (Washington, D. C., 1928), p. 6; also, "The Sixth Pan American Conference," Part I, F. P. A. *Information Service*, Vol. IV, No. 4, April 27, 1928, p. 58.

42. *La Participación de México en la Sexta Conferencia Internacional Americana*, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Mexico City, 1928); and *Circular Informativa Mensual*, 1928, cited, p. 69.

43. Foreign Secretary Gallardo advised Pueyrredón that Argentina could afford to compromise on the question of tariffs in order to feel free to act with "absolute intransigence" in the matter of intervention, a subject which Pueyrredón had been instructed to bring up at Havana. The Argentine Foreign Secretary believed that if the conference failed on the issue of intervention, the responsibility for the failure would fall largely upon the United States. (*Circular Informativa Mensual*, cited, p. 77.)

44. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

46. In contrast with this it is to the point to recall that in the latter part of Irigoyen's first administration there was a definite tendency to cooperate with the United States. In 1921, for example, Argentina and the United States cooperated in the matter of extending recognition to the Saavedra government which had come into power in Bolivia by a coup d'état. In an exchange of notes, the State Department explained that before it extended recognition it wished to know whether the Saavedra government was supported by public opinion, in ac-

LABOR AND CAPITAL

Meanwhile, Irigoyen's popularity with organized labor gradually declined. The steady rise in living costs in Buenos Aires, the speculation of middlemen in foodstuffs, unemployment, and other factors could have been dealt with only through a clearly defined administrative and legislative program, which the *Partido Radical Personalista* lacked. It had, to be sure, given certain benefits to the workers. Thus, in 1929 Irigoyen had decreed that all railroad workers should be granted an annual vacation with pay.⁴⁷ Furthermore, he had resisted the efforts of business interests to outlaw the dock-workers' unions in Buenos Aires and Rosario. On the other hand, Irigoyen had not hesitated to use the army in suppressing strikes. In Rosario strikers had been jailed; in Santa Fé agrarian leaders had been imprisoned when they threatened to tie up the 1929 wheat harvest.⁴⁸ In Mendoza extremist labor groups had been held in check by censorship and close surveillance. By this equivocal attitude the government had been unable either to win completely the loyalty of the organized workers or to suppress the activities of extremists; so that in 1929 and 1930 serious strikes continued to tie up shipping and railway traffic in Corrientes, Santa Fé and Buenos Aires.⁴⁹

Of even greater significance was the increasing dissatisfaction with the *Radicales Personalistas* among business groups. The reasons for this opposition were well defined. Shippers were continually faced with tie-ups in the ports. In Rosario, for example, late in July 1929, during a strike of dock-workers, twenty-one overseas carriers were in port waiting to unload and thirty-two more were waiting for berths.⁵⁰ Goods were piled

high on the wharves waiting to be moved; losses and rising labor costs resulted in increased trans-oceanic rates with a consequent loss in trade.⁵¹ Middlemen and wholesalers were continually in fear of the competition of the government in the sale of wheat, flour, meat and sugar in the domestic market. Apprehension was felt, likewise, over Irigoyen's repeated proposals to break up the large estates as a preliminary step to thorough agrarian reform. In the closing days of his first administration he had drafted a bill providing for the expropriation of lands adjacent to railways and roads, and their distribution among tenant farmers in small lots.

Irigoyen's Proposal to Nationalize Oil Lands

Irigoyen's attitude on petroleum legislation also provoked opposition. In September 1919 he had submitted to Congress a draft of a law which set aside large areas of oil land for government exploitation. The law also provided for a progressive extension of these areas and empowered the Executive to expropriate private property in the enforcement of the law.⁵² In 1927 and 1928 the Chamber of Deputies finally acted favorably on Irigoyen's proposal, but on both occasions the Senate vetoed the bill.

The Gold Conversion Office

Commercial and financial circles criticized Irigoyen's conduct of affairs on two other matters—the closing of the Conversion Office (*Caja de Conversión*) and the non-revision of import duties.

The Gold Conversion Office had been established by law in 1899 to stabilize the currency. This law fixed the value of the notes then in circulation—some 290 million paper pesos—and all notes to be issued in the future at 44 cents gold to one paper peso. It provided that gold and paper pesos should be freely interchangeable at the Conversion Office at this ratio, or conversely, at the rate of one gold peso for 2.27 paper pesos. It was provided further that for every gold peso withdrawn from the Conversion Office an equivalent amount in paper currency

cordance with its policy of "fomenting the orderly and peaceful development of constitutional government in America." In this apparent extension to South America of President Wilson's doctrine of recognition Argentina concurred, and recognition was accorded Saavedra by both Argentina and the United States on February 5, 1921 (Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria, 1922-1923*, p. 29, 35.)

In January 1921, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby visited Buenos Aires for the express purpose of showing that "there does not exist, nor has there ever existed, the least vestige of friction on the part of the Government of the United States on account of the policy followed by the Argentine Government during the great war." (Argentina, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, *Memoria, 1920-1921*, p. 198.) Secretary Colby's visit was successful, Irigoyen having impressed him as "a simple, moderate man, with a clear understanding, lucid expression, a profound master of social and industrial problems and passionately interested in the lower class." (*Ibid.*, p. 201.)

47. *La Prensa* (Buenos Aires), March 12, 1930.

48. *Review of the River Plate*, July 5, 1929.

49. *La Prensa*, October 12, 1929.

50. *Review of the River Plate*, July 26, 1929.

51. British Chamber of Commerce (Buenos Aires), *Monthly Journal*, June 1929.

52. For the text of the draft, cf. Argentina, *Circular Informativa Mensual*, cited, September 1919, p. 519-520.

should be recalled from circulation. Because of this fixed ratio and because of the important part played by the Conversion Office in helping the government to meet its obligations abroad, any serious dislocation in Argentina's balance of payments necessitating the export of gold would affect the stability of the national currency.

During 1928 and 1929 a decrease of exports over imports necessitated the shipment of gold abroad. During 1929 these gold exports amounted to \$204,000,000. Since, according to the law, 2.27 paper pesos had to be called out of circulation for every gold peso drawn from the Conversion Office, an increase of prices followed, with a consequent rise in the cost of living. To check this tendency, Irigoyen ordered the closing of the Conversion Office on December 16, 1929, and also suspended Article 7 of the law of 1899 which provided for the exchange of paper against gold pesos. Thus, in effect, the gold standard was abandoned.

Irigoyen was generally attacked for these measures, most of the criticism coming from shipping interests, bankers, brokers, and others interested in international trade. The President defended himself by stating that had he permitted the continuance of the drain on the Conversion Office for gold shipments, the value of the entire national currency would have been destroyed; that other countries had prohibited gold exports in times of stress; and that the measure had been necessary to stop speculation.

Irigoyen's Attitude Toward an Increased Tariff

Throughout his second administration Irigoyen was pressed by business groups interested in the development of Argentine industry for an upward revision of the tariff. Cotton growers presented a memorial to the President on August 22, 1930, urging immediate increases in duties on cotton goods. Executive aid was asked for the sugar industry, existing stocks of sugar having

climbed steadily above the 366,000 tons on hand in 1925, compared with the normal yearly production of 421,000 tons.⁵³ Rice growers pointed to their decreasing acreage in the face of increasing imports from Brazil, whose rice industry, it was claimed, was thriving at the expense of Argentina.⁵⁴

Irigoyen did not accede to the request of the cotton growers,⁵⁵ and the measures which he took to satisfy the Paraguay tea (*yerba mate*) producers were considered by them inadequate. In April 1930 they threatened to suspend operations. More important, however, was the attitude of the *Unión Industrial Argentina*. This organization, representing Argentine industries, launched a vigorous campaign, which lasted throughout 1929 and 1930, in favor of higher import duties. Using the radio as well as the lecture platform and the press, the *Unión Industrial* carried to the business man and the small *entrepreneur* the argument that Argentina's economic stagnation was due largely to Irigoyen's unwillingness to close the country to foreign imports.⁵⁶ The *Unión Industrial* represented what was probably the strongest organized attack on Irigoyen's economic policies outside the sphere of purely partisan politics.

Meanwhile Argentina's foreign trade continued to drop. Exports decreased from 953,744,000 gold pesos in 1929 to 612,550,000 gold pesos in 1930—a decline of nearly 36 per cent.⁵⁷ The commodities most severely affected were wheat—exports of which dropped from 4,036,000 tons in the first six months of 1929 to 1,640,000 tons in a similar period in 1930—maize, flax and hides.⁵⁸ Customs receipts decreased in 1930 to 154,352,000 gold pesos, as compared with 186,718,000 gold pesos in 1929. Added to this was the slump in the maize crop, which, in view of the situation in wheat, had been counted upon to meet Argentina's obligations abroad.⁵⁹ Partly to offset its difficulties, the government negotiated a loan for £5,000,000 in December 1929.

THE REVOLUTION OF SEPTEMBER 1930

By the middle of 1930 Irigoyen's position was an exposed one. In his effort to act as

a court of last resort between conflicting interests he had brought on himself the hos-

53. *Revista de Economía Argentina*, March 1929, p. 232.

54. Bunge, *La economía argentina*, cited, III, p. 35.

55. *La Nación*, October 25, 1929.

56. "La industria argentina," *Revista de Economía Argentina*, January 1929.

57. *New York Times*, January 17, 1931.

tility of railway employers, railway workers, dock-laborers, shippers, growers, exporters, small business men and industrialists. In most of the provinces desertions from the *Partido Radical Personalista* had continued, leaving Irigoyen with an ever dwindling number of unconditional supporters. At this juncture the assassination in November 1929 of Senator Lencinas, political boss of Mendoza and an active *anti-Personalista*, precipitated a violent outbreak of public opinion against Irigoyen's intervention in that province.

DEFEAT OF THE PERSONALISTAS IN THE MARCH 1930 ELECTIONS

The congressional elections of March 2, 1930 revealed the weakness of the *Radicales Personalistas*. In La Plata, Entre Ríos, and Tucumán they lost heavily. In the city of Buenos Aires they polled 83,318 votes, in comparison with 127,756 votes in 1928. Of the fourteen deputies elected in the capital, ten were Independent Socialists and opponents of Irigoyen. The total loss of votes by the *Personalistas* throughout the country was over 200,000 compared with the presidential elections of 1928.

Immediately following the March election, Irigoyen's majority bloc in the Chamber of Deputies split. Many of his supporters went over to the ranks of the opposition; Independent Socialists joined with conservatives and other right groups. With party lines thus broken, the Congress of 1930 promised to be incapable of dealing with any of the serious problems confronting the country.

On August 10 socialists, conservatives, independents and *Radicales Anti-Personal-*

istas issued a manifesto attacking the government vigorously.⁵⁸ Mass meetings were held in the capital throughout that month in which every phase of Irigoyen's administration was denounced. During this time the President made no move to suppress his enemies' efforts to arouse public opinion to a revolutionary heat.

By the end of August it was clear that the situation was getting out of the hands of the government. General José F. Uriburu, an influential figure in the army and the son of a former Conservative President of Argentina, was approached by a number of officers in July 1929, and invited to support a revolution. On August 16, 1930 Uriburu was ready to strike.⁵⁹

On August 28 a cordon of police was thrown around the President's house at his order and on August 30 the troops were ordered to remain at their quarters ready for action. An encounter between police and students on September 3, which resulted in the death of one student, definitely aroused the revolutionary spirit. Martial law was declared. Civilians demanded Irigoyen's resignation. On the morning of September 6 General Uriburu marched into Buenos Aires at the head of the rebellious army units. Airplanes dropped the revolutionary manifesto on the capital and made it clear that the rebels could count on the air forces. Irigoyen, after turning over the executive power to Vice President Martínez, fled the capital and on the same day signed his resignation as President of the republic. General Uriburu then assumed control through a provisional government.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL URIBURU

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The provisional government was immediately faced by serious economic difficulties. There was, first of all, the need for balancing the budget. In November 1930 revenues

for 1931 were officially estimated at 650 million paper pesos (\$275,925,000).⁶⁰ Of this amount 239 million paper pesos (\$101,455,500) would be required for the service of the public debt and 36 million (\$15,282,000) for pensions,⁶¹ leaving only 375 million paper pesos (\$159,287,500) for administrative expenditures in 1931, as compared with approximately 600 million paper pesos (\$254,700,000) available for this purpose in 1930. More than 50 per cent of these revenues represented export and import duties. In

58. *La Nación*, August 6, 1930.

59. *Revista de Economía Argentina*, March 1930, p. 196.

60. *La Nación*, August 10, 1930.

61. Oscar R. Silva, *La participación de la 3a. División del Ejército en la Revolución del 6 de Septiembre de 1930* (Buenos Aires, 1931).

62. Ordinary revenues for 1929 amounted to 718 million paper pesos (\$304,791,000), and for 1930 to 618 million paper pesos (\$262,341,000). The deficits of these two years were met in part by internal loans and in part were carried forward as a debt which the provisional government has had to face. All conversions have been made at par of exchange—42.45 cents a paper peso. Exchange at present, however, is only slightly more than half of par.

63. *Circular Informativa Mensual*, cited, November 1930, p. 109.

view of the heavy debt service⁶⁴ and the prospect of declining revenues, the government was compelled to scale down its expenditures in all departments. The Department of Public Works, for example, successively reduced its budget for 1931 from 207 million paper pesos (\$87,871,500) to 100 million paper pesos (\$42,450,000).⁶⁵ Cuts in government salaries ranging from 15 to 25 per cent were proposed, and it was hoped to reduce the total government expenditures for 1931 by 200 million paper pesos (\$84,900,000).

Tariff Measures

Aside from achieving economies and reducing the deficit, the government has increased internal taxes and has definitely adopted a protective policy by increasing import duties.⁶⁶ The importation of Paraguay tea was prohibited in January 1931.⁶⁷ In February duties were levied on articles which had up to that time been on the free list—such as fuel oil, books, office equipment, rubber goods and foodstuffs. These increases, varying from 5 to 50 per cent, were in line with the demand of Argentine interests who wished to capture the domestic market.⁶⁸

The decline in imports due to higher duties was directly in line with the government's policy of attempting to balance the foreign trade of the country. By June 1931 there was a favorable trade balance of over \$22,000,000, although the total foreign trade of Argentina in the first five months of 1931 was approximately 17 per cent under that for the corresponding months in 1930. This balance was made possible by a decrease of 24 per cent in imports during the first six months of 1931 as compared with the same period in 1930. In an effort to maintain this advantage until the end of 1931, extraordinary efforts are being made to keep grain moving out of the country. On August 3, for example, a record was established for

one-day shipments when 141,518 tons of grain were loaded.⁶⁹ Optimistic estimates place the favorable balance of trade at the end of 1931 at \$100,000,000.⁷⁰

The Currency Problem

In spite of having successfully established a favorable balance in the foreign trade of the country, General Uriburu has not been able to ease the strain on Argentine currency. This is largely due to the steady fall in value of the principal commodities exported—grain and linseed. For the first six months of 1931 linseed and grain exports increased 94 per cent in volume; their value, however, declined 4 per cent as compared with 1930.⁷¹ In order to meet the service charges on the foreign debt, the government has had to draw on the gold funds of the Conversion Office, a policy to which Irigoyen was opposed.⁷² For the first six months of 1931 gold shipments from the Conversion Office totalled \$69,000,000, as compared with \$628,000 in the corresponding period in 1930. The result has been a steady decline in the reserve fund. In October 1930 the gold in the Conversion Office amounted to 439,990,000 gold pesos (\$364,583,532); early in August 1931 it was 313 million gold pesos (\$296,348,400).⁷³ Since the currency in circulation has remained fairly constant, the depletion of the gold fund represents a decrease in the reserve ratio from 84.24 per cent, where it stood in April 1928, to around 62 per cent, the figure for early August 1931. The paper peso has steadily declined as a consequence. As against a par value of 42.45 cents, it was quoted at 21.93 cents on October 15, 1931.

This steady decline of the peso is the most disturbing factor in Argentina's economic position. Although psychological factors undoubtedly are partly responsible, the drop of the peso has been brought about by several other causes. Among these are:

1. Uncertainty as to the amount of the deficit to be faced by the national government this year. Recent unofficial estimates place it at about 100,000,000 paper pesos.

64. On October 1, 1930 the service charges on Argentina's total public debt amounted to over 270 million paper pesos (\$114,615,000) annually.

65. *La Nación*, July 8, 1931.

66. *Commerce Reports*, June 8, 1931, p. 584.

67. *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, January 10, 1931, p. 211.

68. A further indication of this protective tendency was Ambassador Malbrán's speech before the National Foreign Trade Council in New York City on May 28, 1931. The Argentine diplomat, in a frank discussion of trade conditions, stated that Argentina was learning a lesson from the United States in the matter of protective tariffs. (*La Prensa*, New York, May 29, 1931.)

69. *La Prensa* (New York), August 17, 1931.

70. Argentina's favorable trade balance for the first eight months of 1931 is estimated officially at \$40,151,357. (*New York Herald Tribune*, September 25, 1931.)

71. *Commerce Reports*, July 20, 1931, p. 138.

72. Cf. p. 317.

73. *Commerce Reports*, August 10, 1931, p. 336.

2. The drain on the gold supply of the Conversion Office for bullion remittances to the United States.

3. The extension of the policy of allowing the Conversion Office to substitute commercial paper as a guarantee for the national currency in place of the gold that is withdrawn for shipment abroad.

4. The general depression of Argentina's foreign markets, notably for meat and grain.

5. The inelasticity of the currency.

6. The uncertainty of the political situation.

7. The difficulties encountered in meeting the loan of \$50,000,000 which fell due October 1, 1931.

Of these problems the most pressing is the \$50,000,000 loan. This loan was floated in the United States in September 1930, the proceeds being used to retire an equal amount of one-year notes falling due October 1, 1930. The loan was placed in the form of 5 per cent treasury notes and sold at \$100.36, an unusual circumstance considering conditions in Argentina at the time. Recent press reports indicate that one-half of the loan will be renewed by American bankers. The balance—\$25,000,000—will be paid off with bullion, necessitating a further shipment of metal to the United States.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

In the sphere of foreign relations the provisional government has reversed Irigoyen's policy of reserve. Three Argentine jurists were appointed to serve on the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. After the visit of Sir Eric Drummond to Argentina early in 1931, the government appointed Miguel Casares, former Secretary of Agriculture, to the Economic Committee of the League.⁷⁴ The friendly offices of the republic were offered to Paraguay, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador for the settlement of pending boundary disputes. In July Argentina signed the 1925 convention for the limitation of traffic in narcotics, and an Ambassador, Senor Malbrán, was sent to Washington.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS

In addition to the economic problems already discussed, the provisional government has faced serious political issues.

Immediately upon taking office on September 6, 1930, General Uriburu, backed by

conservatives and the army and the navy, established a state of siege throughout the country.⁷⁵ Congress was dissolved and was not to convene again until after new elections.⁷⁶ Federal interventions were ordered in twelve of the fourteen provinces.⁷⁷ Moreover, in finally calling for presidential elections for November 8, 1931, the procedure prescribed by law was set aside, since the next presidential elections would not occur until April 1934.⁷⁸ General Uriburu also changed by decree the order in which the presidency should be filled in case of vacancy.⁷⁹ The opposition contends that these acts amount to a suspension of the Constitution.

Elections

Uriburu, meanwhile, had promised early elections, and, further, that neither he nor any of the members of his government would seek to continue in office when a normal constitutional régime should be established.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, only one provincial election has been held—that in Buenos Aires on April 5, 1931. In that election the *Partido Radical*, opposed to Uriburu, polled over 210,000 votes, as compared with 187,000 votes by the conservatives. When the results of the election became known the government prevented the provincial electoral college from meeting and ordered the suspension of the elections scheduled in Santa Fé, Córdoba and Corrientes.⁸¹

75. Under Article 67, Section 26, and Article 86, Section 19, of the Argentine Constitution the declaration of a state of siege by the President must be confirmed by Congress at the next regular session following such declaration.

76. The Constitution does not give the Executive power to dissolve Congress. According to Article 86, Section 12, the President may only prorogue a regular session or call a special session.

77. *Boletín Oficial*, October 9, 1930, p. 281.

78. Cf. *Ley electoral de 10 Febrero de 1919*, Article 22.

79. *Circular Informativa Mensual*, cited, November 1930, p. 91. The law of September 19, 1868 prescribed that in the case of death or disability of the President that office should be filled in order by the Vice President, the president *pro tem* of the Senate, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Following the resignation of Vice President Martínez on September 6, 1930, the decree cited changed the presidential succession to the following order: Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Foreign Relations, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Justice, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of Agriculture, and Secretary of Public Works.

80. Argentina, Ministerio del Interior, *Documentos Iniciales de la Revolución* (Buenos Aires, 1930), p. 18.

81. Apparently both the provisional government and the *Radicales* misjudged the political situation in Buenos Aires province. On March 5 the *Radicales* petitioned the government to postpone the elections on the ground that the state of siege had prevented them from organizing. (*La Nación*, March 13, 1931.) The provisional government, sure of its position, rejected the proposal. The *Partido Radical* thereupon (March 27) published a manifesto in which it was stated that the *Radicales* would go to the polls and in which the defeat of the *Partido Radical* was anticipated. The results of the elections, therefore, were a surprise to both the provisional government and the *Radicales*.

74. *New York Times*, February 16, 1931.

Even more difficult has been the question of national congressional and presidential elections. By a decree of May 8, 1931, general provincial elections and national congressional elections were called for November 8, 1931. At that time General Uriburu refused to fix this date for the presidential election, on the ground that no political party had nominated a candidate who could give guarantees of law and order. Subsequently, however, the Provisional President issued a decree calling for presidential elections on November 8 also.

Parties

As a condition of the election, General Uriburu insists that the various political parties must be reorganized.⁸² This reorganization, however, must proceed in accordance with the views of the government and General Uriburu is determined that Irigoyen and his partisans shall not return to power by election. He has, therefore, definitely blocked the political activity of all who have ever been associated with Irigoyen. On October 7, Uriburu vetoed the presidential candidacy of former President Marcelo T. de Alvear, who was backed by the *Radicales*.⁸³ Alvear had returned to Argentina after Irigoyen's fall to reorganize the *Partido Radical*. He was meeting with success when on July 25 he was ordered to leave the country and the central office of the *Partido Radical* was closed. Honorio Pueyrredón, who had received the majority of votes cast for governor in the Buenos Aires election of April 5, also was exiled.

In vetoing the candidacy of Alvear, who went out of office in 1928, Uriburu based his action on Article 77 of the Constitution, which provides that no President may be re-elected until one term of six years has elapsed. Alvear's supporters believe,

however, that Uriburu's action is based on the assumption that the Constitution is still in force. Nevertheless, the country has been under a state of siege since September 7, 1930. The provinces have been uniformly placed in the hands of *interventores* and the country has been governed by decrees. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in a statement made on September 10, 1930, recognized the provisional government as a *de facto* government.⁸⁴ If, as Alvear's supporters contend, the Constitution is at present suspended, Article 77 is without effect and Alvear, therefore, cannot be disqualified.

The Socialists have been curbed in similar fashion. Their leaders—Repetto, Bravo and Ghiodi—have been imprisoned, though they were not detained long. In August the Socialist editor, Natalio Botana, was given the choice of prison or exile.

PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

As a second condition for terminating the provisional government, Uriburu insists on the adoption of various constitutional reforms. According to the Provisional President, the object of the reforms would be to make impossible a repetition of the alleged evils of the Irigoyen régime. The right of the President to intervene in the provinces would be curtailed by giving the Supreme Court the power to determine whether such interventions were proper. Congress would be made independent of the Executive by reducing the number of congressmen needed to form a quorum, thus diminishing the opportunity for dilatory tactics on the part of a government-controlled bloc.⁸⁵ The freedom of the provinces to contract loans abroad would be curtailed and the system of taxation would be reorganized in order more equitably to distribute tax funds throughout the country. The independence of the judiciary would be increased by providing that appointees to the federal bench should be nominated by the judges themselves, the executive and the legislative branches having merely the power to confirm such nominations.⁸⁶ General Uriburu proposes to submit

82. In the decree of May 8, 1931 General Uriburu stated that if "the civic forces [political parties] arrive at a concordance for the institutional reconstruction of the country and should proclaim candidates for the Presidency and the Vice Presidency of the Republic signifying guarantees of order, of peace and progress, the Provisional Government, which does not respond to partisan interests but rather to the great and permanent interests of the country, will make the convocation extensive likewise to the Presidential elections, so that they may take place simultaneously with the others on the day fixed by the present decree; that if the political parties do not manage to arrive at these results, the Provisional Government, which considers that its task should not be prolonged indefinitely, will convoke to elections of President and Vice President as soon as congress is installed, to which body it will in any case, once it is consulted, submit the bases which the Government judges necessary for the reorganization of the country." For the text of the decree, cf. *Review of the River Plate*, May 15, 1931, p. 11.

83. *New York Herald Tribune*, October 9, 1931.

84. *Circular Informativa Mensual*, cited, September 1930, p. 5.

85. Cf. p. 312.

86. *Documentos Iniciales de la Revolución*, cited, p. 49.

these reforms to the Congress that is to be elected on November 8. According to the Constitution, however, these reforms should later be submitted to a constitutional convention.

There is general agreement among responsible leaders that Uriburu's objectives are desirable, but his opponents assert that he is using the proposed constitutional amendments as an excuse to remain in power. Thus, although Uriburu has fixed the date for the presidential election, he has given no indication of when the provisional government will transfer its authority to a regular régime.

CONCLUSION

Discontent with these conditions has been

increasing and at least once—on July 20, 1931 in the province of Corrientes—an attempt was made to overthrow the provisional government by force. Dissatisfaction, moreover, continues. A large section of the *Partido Radical* believes that Uriburu's veto of Alvear's candidacy is a definite challenge and that the continuation of the state of siege, together with the Provisional President's insistence on his program of constitutional amendments, is a repudiation of the principles of the revolution. Only the events of the next few months will determine whether the Uriburu régime is attempting to establish a dictatorship or to restore constitutional government.

Statement of the Ownership, Management, Circulation, Etc.,
Required by the Act of Congress of August 24, 1912, of

Foreign Policy Reports

Published by-weekly at New York, N. Y., for October 1, 1931.
State of New York, County of New York, ss.

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared Esther G. Ogden, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that she is the Secretary of the Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, publisher of the FOREIGN POLICY REPORTS, and that the following is, to the best of her knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management, etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, embodied in Section 411, Postal Laws and Regulations, printed on the reverse of this form, to wit:

1. That the names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are:

Publisher—Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, 18 East 41st Street, New York City.

Editor—Wilbur L. Williams, 18 East 41st Street, New York City.

Managing Editor—None.

Business Managers—None.

2. That the owner is:

Foreign Policy Association, Incorporated, the principal officers of which are: James G. McDonald, Chairman; Esther G. Ogden, Secretary; both of 18 East 41st Street, New York, N. Y.; and Albert Lytle Deane, Treasurer, 1775 Broadway, New York, N. Y.

3. That the known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are:

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4. That the two paragraphs next above, giving the names of the owners, stockholders, and security holders, if any, contain not only the list of stockholders and security holders as they appear upon the books of the company but also, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, is given; also that the said two paragraphs contain statements embracing affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner; and this affiant has no reason to believe that any other person, association, or corporation has any interest direct or indirect in the said stock, bonds, or other securities than as so stated by her.

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated.

By ESTHER G. OGDEN, Secretary.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 22nd day of September, 1931.

[Seal]

CAROLYN E. MARTIN, Notary Public.

New York County, New York, County Clerk's No. 295.

Reg. No. 3M346.

(My commission expires March 30, 1933.)